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Abstract 
As human beings, we understand and make sense of the social world using social cognition. Social 
cognitions are cognitive processes through which we understand, process, and recall our 
interactions with others. Most agent-based models do not account for social cognition; rather, they 
either provide detailed models of task-related cognition or model many actors and focus on social 
processes. In general, the more cognitively realistic the models, the less they explain human social 
behavior and the more computationally expensive it is to model a single agent. In contrast, in this 
research an agent-based model containing an explicit model of social cognition is developed. 
Results from this model demonstrate that adding social cognition both improves the model 
veridicality and decreases computation costs. 
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Introduction 
  
Scholars define social cognition, broadly, as the way humans understand and process their 
interactions with others (Greenwald & Banaji 1995). This includes interpreting human interaction, 
drawing inferences from spoken and unspoken communication, and developing an understanding 
of group dynamics. Like any notion of cognition, social cognition can be studied at various levels 
of abstraction. At the neurological level, scholars have made inroads in understanding social 
cognition’s biological origins (Frith & Frith 2008). One level “up” on the abstraction hierarchy, 
cognitive psychologists have developed models of how stereotypes are embedded within 
interpretable, but cognitively faithful, mental representations (e.g. Bem 1981, Brashears et al. 
2013). Social psychologists have studied how human actions are a function of culturally shared 
affective meanings, represented as a parsimonious set of numerical values (Heise 2007), and the 
cognitive turn in sociology has wrought about similar sorts of empirical models of cognition and 
culture (Goldberg 2011; Lizardo 2014). 
 
Recent work has begun integrating theory and data at multiple cognitive abstraction levels. For 
example, Schröder and Thagard (2013) integrate biological, cognitive and social psychological 
research into a unified model of how social behavior emerges from a neuropsychological theory 
of semantic pointers. A long-standing question, however, is how to integrate model based theories 
of cognition with model based theories of social structural dynamics (e.g. Carley 1991; Lizardo & 
Strand 2010). One reason why theorizing about this intersection is difficult is that methods to 
capture empirical data for theories linking social structure and cognition are difficult to collect and 
measure (Brashears 2013). An alternative approach is to link cognition and structure via theory 
implemented as computer simulation (e.g. Carley 1991), specifically agent-based models. As 
suggested by Schröder and Thagard (2013 pg. 275), “Multiagent models, simulating 
communication between multiple virtual agents in artificial societies … might one day shed light 
on how stable, consensual structures of affective meaning are generated and maintained in 
cultures.” 
 
The present work focuses on an advancement of an existing, empirically validated agent-based 
model called Construct (Schreiber & Carley 2013) with an approach to social cognition that is 
significantly more faithful to cognition than prior iterations. Interestingly, this increase in 
faithfulness is achieved by more faithfully modeling limitations (rather than features) of human 
cognition. Within the agent-based modeling literature, the proposed approach is novel, but its goals 
are not (Bainbridge et al. 1994). 
 
Socially realistic models tend to be lax in terms of the “cognitive” representation of socio-cognitive 
processes. Extant dynamic network socio-cultural models (e.g., Carley & Ren 2001) may have 
representations of alters in the “cognitions” of agents, and what those alters think or believe, but 
the informative mechanisms of social cognition are deterministically noisy perceptions of the 
simulation’s ground-truth. This is not sufficient because it is not a good model of how we create 
or inform inferences of others. Humans can, and often do, draw and even act on inferences about 
what others think and know merely from their first glance at them, before they have even spoken 
their first word. Thus, agent-based models should be able to represent such a social cognitive 
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mechanism, while still retaining the computational efficiencies of socially realistic, cognitively-
poor agent-based models. 
 
This research addresses this gap in simulation technologies and social theory. on the proposed 
approach connects existing cognitive, social psychological abstractions of social cognition into an 
overarching model of dynamic social structure. While the model described lacks faithfulness to 
many conceptualizations of social cognition, it provides an efficient formalization to span these 
abstraction levels while retaining complexity.  
 
The behavior of this model is examined and validated by examining its capability to replicate a 
number of “stylized facts” (Kaldor 1961) that have been shown to exist empirically. For example, 
the model’s capability to faithfully represent known interactional patterns between members of 
different social groups (Tajfel and Turner 1979) is explored. The model’s ability to accurately 
portray these facts is determined via both quantitative and qualitative evaluation of model output, 
a form of “docking” (Axtell, Axelrod, Epstein, & Cohen 1996). This approach is taken rather than 
simply running more simulations as statistical significance is guaranteed to be achieved by running 
more simulations; whereas, examining qualitative patterns provides better theoretical guidance.  
 
In all cases, model output is compared to an existing agent-based model that provides a less faithful 
and more computationally expensive representation of social cognition. The results of the virtual 
experiment demonstrate that the proposed model provides outputs that better match empirical data. 
Further, a combination of theoretical analysis and experimentation is used to prove that the 
proposed model is computationally more efficient than this prior work. 
  
Related Work 
 
This section contains a brief review of extant approaches to social cognition in agent-based models, 
and lessons that can be learned from these models, as well as prior implementations of a theory of 
mind implemented as transactive memory system. While significant work focuses on social 
cognition and its intersection with social interaction and social structure, the present discussion is 
restricted chiefly to work that is germane to computationally modeling these processes. 
 
Modeling Social Behavior 
 
Several models have employed aspects of social cognition to examine inter-agent behavior without 
ascribing to a rigorous general cognitive model. For example, De Weerd, Verbrugge, and Verheij 
(2013) showed the competitive advantage of modeling an adversary’s thought processes. 
Chavalarias (2005) used game-theoretic models to explore how imitation behaviors can lead to 
social differentiation. Paul, Pickett, Sherman, and Schank (2012) used Optimal Distinctiveness 
Theory (Brewer 1991) to inform a Schelling-esque model (1971) of how different social 
configurations could stabilize, showing that a social space’s initial configuration strongly affects 
the persistent patterns of group identity. Friedkin (2006) demonstrated the movement of 
individual’s to group norms via a social influence process on opinion formation. 
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Deep models of individual cognition, such as those implemented in Soar (Laird 2012) or ACT-R 
(Anderson et al. 2004), are rarely implemented in situations where inter-agent communication is 
required, let alone collaboration or coordination. When they are, model developers create specific 
code and working memory elements that represent alters but there are not explicit architectural 
mechanisms for social cognition or theory of mind. Examples of domain-specific implementations 
include inferences on enemy locations in adversarial agent-simulations (Best, Lebiere, & 
Scarpinatto 2002) or assigning tasks to flight squadron members (Jones et al. 1999). There has 
been interesting work placing ACT-R modeling within an organizational context (Helmhout 
2006). However, such models are computationally infeasible to utilize when one wishes to perform 
simulations of large numbers of agents. Recent cognitive models with some social cognition scale 
successfully into the hundreds of agents (Kaulakis et al. 2012). 
 
Prior Implementations of Theory of Mind 
 
The proposed model is a formalization of a theory of mind, an element of general social cognition, 
to improve agent-based simulation of human actors. At the core of this theory of mind is a multi-
level transactive memory system. Transactive memory is an explanatory mechanism of “how 
groups process and structure information” (Wegner 1987). Wegner suggests that humans both 
encode information internally and encode the location of external information resources. These 
external resources can include notebooks, file cabinets, databases, and, most importantly, other 
human beings. A person may not know, for example, how to diagnose a problem with a car, but 
that same person may know that a mechanic is a good starting point. This encoding capacity is 
essential to both what allows groups to be efficient, and allows people to specialize usefully in 
their work. 
 
Prior simulation efforts have modeled this human capacity as a three-element tuple, ijs. Each agent 
i has for alter j a perception of alter j‘s knowledge of information set s. Palazzolo and his 
collaborators (2006) had a continuous value (from 0 to 1) for this three-element tuple, representing 
perceived likelihood of an alter having information of use related to that knowledge set. Carley 
and Ren (2001) represented each sub-element in each agent’s representation of alters as a binary. 
Thus, agents may believe an agent knows or does not know a specific piece of knowledge (an 
information element in one or more sets s). Construct (Carley 1991), the agent-based dynamic-
network simulation model extended herein, integrates  the model of transactive memory as 
described in Carley and Ren (2001), and then further extends it to account for multiple modes of 
interaction and diverse communication modalities (Carley, Martin, & Hirshman 2009). 
 
These prior efforts are functional, but are necessarily scale limited. As the agent population 
increases, the computer memory requirements increase exponentially. However, humans are able 
to function socially despite being conceptually aware of thousands, if not millions, of other human 
beings. Consistent with the Carnegie School (Cyert & March 1963; March & Simon 1958; Simon 
1957) theoretical position the proposed model is predicated on the assumption that human memory 
capacity is not functionally infinite. Instead, it is argued that humans are boundedly rational 
(Simon, 1991) and must have a mechanism that conserves memory capacity yet retains 
functionality. 
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Theoretical Approach: The Generalized Other to inform 
Transactive Memory 
 
As a candidate mechanism, humans are modeled as being capable of holding detailed transactive 
memory representations for a limited number of people. For others, humans hold coarser 
representations inferred from group membership. In other words, humans hold stereotypes, or 
prejudices, that inform their perceptions of what others know. While the terms stereotype and 
prejudice have functionally distinct meanings in the social psychological literature (Hewstone et 
al. 2002), the concept that group memberships inform one individual’s perceptions of others is a 
core component of social cognition.  
 
Mead’s (1925) Generalized Other is a foundational root in the study of human stereotyping. Mead 
argued that people make and retain persistent inferential statements on ethical behavior, such as 
“people of type X tend to do thing Y”. Multiple such statements may be active at the same time, 
and in aggregate, Mead called these the “Generalized Other’. People, Mead claimed, use the 
Generalized Other to regulate their own behavior by acting in compliance with the statements 
applicable to themselves. People can also use the Generalized Other to understand the behavior of 
others. It is assumed that Mead would also be comfortable with the idea that people can make 
similar inferential statements, “people of type X tend to know or believe thing Y” for he wrote 
(1925, pg. 275), “[s]ocial control depends, then, upon the degree to which the individuals in society 
are able to assume the attitudes of others who are involved with them in common endeavor.”  
 
From Mead’s work springs a rich collection of psychological, sociological and social 
psychological research on stereotypes. For example, Stryker’s (1980; 2008) sociological and 
structural take on symbolic interactionism definitively argues that humans perform stereotyping 
on different “types” of others. From a psychological perspective, many scholars have addressed 
an immediate following question, how are “types” of people identified? Mead suggested that there 
exists a large common group, called in his work “society”, but also that humans concurrently 
maintained additional inferential statements for all relevant types. In the proposed model, 
embodies the theory that external, that is, clearly visible group memberships may be sufficient to 
distinguish “types”. Thus, types are a fixed and uniformly agreed upon set, which is a 
simplification of human experience. This representation is a formalization of the “minimal” group 
paradigm suggested by Tajfel, Turner and their colleagues (1979; 1981). In the paradigm, group 
memberships are clearly and universally defined (by, e.g., the color of one’s shirt in an 
experimental setting; see Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament 1971). Importantly, this representation 
is a limitation of this implementation, not the overall model’s theoretical underpinnings. Even 
including this limitation, the salience and precise representations of different group memberships 
are informed entirely from individual experience. Thus, each agent may have its own wildly 
different understanding of its social context. 
 
From the literature referenced above, three transactive memory tiers essential to the proposed 
multi-level implementation are identifiable: 
 
- Personal: I know this individual and have specific perceptions about what they do and 
do not know. 
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- Group: I do not know this individual, but I have perceptions about groups to which I 
believe they belong. 
- Global: I do not know this individual, and I do not have perceptions about the groups 
to which I believe they belong. 
-  
Scholars often discuss both the Generalized Other and stereotyping within schema theory’s 
(Rumelhart 1978; 1980) cognitive framework. In this context, a schema represents a memory 
structure for retaining generic concepts. In schema theory, each individual has a hierarchy of 
schema applicable to specific environmental conditions. Schemata that help us understand who 
other people are and what they are likely to know “Social Schema” (Kuethe 1962). These produced 
social schema are culturally dependent (Little 1968), but their production mechanism is expected 
to be endemic to the human condition and not to be culturally dependent.  
 
In schema theory, environmental cues determine schema availability. Individuals use available 
schema to make inferences about their environment. Unavailable schema do not burden the 
individual’s resources. In cognitive agent systems (Anderson 1996), schema-like representations 
have been used to produce human-like cognition as agents learn tasks, and agents may have many 
schema (implemented as production rules, a specific form of schema that use if-then structures) 
active simultaneously. Work by Duong and Reilly (1995) used a hierarchy of neural-networks to 
implement schema theory and model Mead’s Symbolic Interactionism (Mead 1925), producing a 
hiring model showing racial bias.  
 
Anderson and his collaborators (2004) suggest, and give empirical evidence, that chunks of human 
memory are “activated” when they are used. This activation decays over time with non-use. An 
actor’s schemas can be associated with an “activation score”, allowing one to determine the 
accessibility of the schema to the agent. These activation scores, according to Anderson, determine 
if an agent is able to recall a chunk. If the agent cannot recall the chunk, it must do without it.  
 
The proposed model takes advantage of this approach’s computational tractability, but changes the 
activated chunk’s granularity. Rather than each chunk representing a single schema-object, of 
which there are many per alter, each chunk represents a specific alter or group. Each interaction 
with an alter is treated as an activation-event, and thus alters (and their groups), which are 
frequently contacted, will have high activation scores. An agent may also receive information 
about an alter or group, and this is also an activation-event. Thus, what schema are used to inform 
behavior are contextually dependent on recent activities and current social structure, an important 
aspect to realistic social cognition (Edmonds 2014). Brashears (2013) showed that social schema 
are active in understanding group structures.  This research goes further to suggest that schemas 
are necessary to conserve limited cognitive resources and allow humans to interact intelligently (if 
heuristically) with unknown others. 
 
For more information on the approach’s implementation, see Joseph, Morgan, Martin, and Carley 
(2014). The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  First, the utility of a multi-level 
transactive memory system is reviewed. Then two virtual experiments for assessment are outlined.  
Then a proof of the computational savings from a multi-level system is provided. Finally, results 
from the virtual experiments are provided, followed by a discussion of limitations and potential 
future work. The results suggest that the multi-level implementation improves model fidelity, 
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conserve’s the agent’s limited cognitive resources, and improves the model’s sensitivity to 
important initial conditions. 
 
Modelable Social Phenomena 
 
The proposed model, Construct-SC, is an extension of Construct (Carley et al. 2009) to include a 
social-cognition adaptation of aforementioned multi-level transactive memory system. Construct 
is a network-centric agent-based simulation of knowledge diffusion within groups. Agents 
communicate information to other agents. Agents may forget knowledge they possess. How 
information diffuses within a group depends on multiple factors: the preferences of individual 
agents, the initial knowledge of each agent, and the social ties between those agents. In Construct, 
a central tenant is that as individuals learn and change what they know, they also change their 
position in the social network, and thus their most likely interaction partners. There are multiple 
biases for preference for interaction, including: 
 
- Homophily, agents prefer interacting with people like themselves (McPherson, Smith-
Lovin, & Cook 2001) 
- Expertise, agents prefer interacting with people with valuable knowledge (Carley & 
Hill 2001) 
- Propinquity, agents prefer interacting with people nearby (Allen 1984) 
 
Both homophily and expertise require perceptions of people’s knowledge. Earlier iterations of 
Construct used an error-prone and stochastic perception of ground-truth. However, later work with 
Construct implemented transactive memory as outlined in Carley and Ren (2001). Agents maintain 
persistent alter representations as transactive memory vectors. Agent interactions inform these 
vectors. In Construct-SC (Social Cognition), the Construct system is modified by: 
 
- Adding transactive memory vectors for groups, of similar form to those for alters; 
- Assigning transactive memory vectors activation scores which change over time; 
- Allowing transactive memory vectors to be lost (or “forgotten”) through disuse. 
 
In both Construct-SC and Construct’s transactive memory system (Carley & Ren 2001), a 
“schema” is a transactive memory vector – a series of K bits, where K represents the number of 
knowledge pieces, or “facts”, in the system. Each bit represents the ego’s perception of the alter’s, 
group’s, or Generalized Other’s knowledge of a fact. While Construct has a single vector for each 
alter, in Construct-SC these schemas are arranged hierarchically. An ego determines what an alter 
knows by starting at the personal level. If that schema is activated above the threshold, then the 
agent uses the alter’s transactive memory vector. If not, the agent will “construct” the alter’s 
knowledge vector from the relevant group schema. If the alter belongs to no relevant groups, then 
the agent uses the Generalized Other’s transactive memory vector. 
 
With these changes, Construct-SC should be able to model social and human phenomena that 
Construct could not. Construct-SC should also replicate results from Construct. In Table 1, a set 
of observations on human social behavior are presented.  For each of these observations, an “X” 
is used to denote whether that observation is reflected in  Construct or Construct-SC respectively. 
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Table 1. Stylized facts of Construct and Construct-SC 
Designed Citation Construct Construct-SC 
Individuals interact with others.  X X 
People interact with others based on their 
perceptions of them. 
 X X 
Individuals reason about a generalized other. Mead 1925  X 
Individuals have perceptions of groups. Stryker 1980  X 
Perceptions of unknown individuals are based 
on their known group affiliations. 
Tajfel and Turner 1979  X 
Group perceptions can be informed by 
interactions with members of that group. 
Carley 1991  X 
    
Emergent Citation Construct Construct-SC 
Diffusion of new information follows an S-
Shaped Curve. 
Rogers 2010 X X 
Heterogeneous groups are more likely to 
discover novel information from outside the 
group than are homophilous groups. 
Granovetter 1983; 2005 X X 
  X X 
Groups with some heterogeneity outperform 
purely homophilous groups. 
Ancona & Caldwell 1992 X X 
Individuals are more likely to interact in-
group than out-group. 
Blau 1977; Tajfel & 
Turner 1979 
X X 
The improvement in task competency of 
cliquish groups will have significantly more 
marginal variation over time. 
West, Barron, Dowsett, 
& Newton 1999 
 X 
Perceptions of others are often based upon 
things such as expected roles, social norms, 
and social categorizations. 
Greenwald & Banaji 
1995; Heise 1979; 2007 
 X 
Arbitrary and even meaningless distinctions 
between groups can trigger a tendency to favor 
one's own group at the expense of others. 
Tajfel et al. 1971  X 
Transactive memory should preserve 
computational resources. 
Wegner 1995  X 
 
Those factors that are “designed” are actual mechanisms built in to the model implementation. 
Those factors that are “emergent” are results that emerge from the model in the virtual experiments. 
 
As Table 1 documents, Construct-SC is a formalized theory that allows for a richer representation 
of the social group phenomena. Table 1 is used to inform the construction and simulation outputs 
of interest for the primary virtual experiment outlined in the next section.  
 
Virtual Experiment Design 
 
Two different virtual experiments inform the results. Virtual Experiment 1 focuses on the question 
“Is this a better model of human behavior?”. Virtual Experiment 2 is used to address the quetion 
“Is this a more computationally efficient implementation of human behavior?”. 
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Virtual Experiment One: Modeling Human Behavior 
 
In the first experiment, Construct-SC is evaluated as a model of human behavior.  It is anticipated 
that Construct-SC will model successfully the stylized facts from Table 1. For this experiment, the 
agent count, the knowledge count, the number of simulation turns, and the task-size (in bits) for 
performance evaluation are kept constant.  
 
Several factors are manipulated that influence the distribution of knowledge. One of these is the 
group structure of the social space. Group structure is controlled by two variables: 1) whether there 
was a single dominant social group, or whether all groups were the same size, and 2) the disparity 
in size between the dominant and non-dominant groups (if there was a dominant group). 
 
The distribution of knowledge across groups is also varied. Three knowledge distributions are 
considered: 1) Group-Based, 2) Random, and 3) Fuzzy Groups. In the Group-Based condition, 
knowledge is distributed based on group affiliation. Each group’s size, relative to the total number 
of agents, indicates how many of the knowledge bits ‘belonged’ to the group, and the group’s 
knowledge bits are assigned stochastically to group member. In the Random condition, knowledge 
is distributed without reference to group membership. In the Fuzzy Group condition,  knowledge 
is distributed primarily, but not entirely, based on group membership. 
 
The social space is also differentiated by whether individuals may be members of multiple groups. 
In the “single” condition, all individuals are members of exactly one group. In the “multiple” 
condition, all individuals are initialized as members of a single group, and then are given a random 
chance (0.25^(number of group-memberships)) to be a member of an additional group, with the 
new group chosen at random from groups to which that individual does not already belong. The 
first group, Group 0, is assumed to be highly interstitial: a person is twice as likely to be assigned 
membership to Group 0 as other groups. 
 
Individuals in the social scene may be more or less driven by desire for interaction with others like 
themselves (Homophily), or with people with rare knowledge (Expertise). Frequently, these drives 
are co-present in people (Carley, Lee, & Krackhardt 2002), as shown, for example, by Valente 
(1996). Three settings are used for these values: 1) “100/0” where all interaction is driven by 
homophily preference; 2) “60/40” where homophily preference is dominant to expertise 
preference; and 3) “0/100” where all interaction is driven by expertise preference. 
 
To contrast Construct and Construct-SC, two variants of the Transactive memory model (TM-
Model) are used. The experimental condition “Full” represents the earlier implementation of 
Construct’s Transactive Memory. The condition “Multi-Level” represents Construct-SC’s new 
Transactive Memory implementation. 
 
Agents are evaluated on several dependent variables, including in-group interaction probability, 
out-group interaction probability, knowledge diffusion over time, and task performance over time.  
In-group interaction probability is the average, across agents, of the summation of probabilities of 
interacting with fellow group members.  Out-group interaction probability is, similarly, the 
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average, across agents, of the summation of probabilities of interacting with alters outside the 
group. Knowledge diffusion is the sum of each agent’s knowledge-bit count.  Task performance 
is evaluated using a binary classification task (Carley 1992). In a binary classification task, agent 
knowledge is used as a mask over a binary string, and the task for the agent is to successfully guess 
whether a string is more 1s or 0s. To evaluate task performance,   the set of knowledge bits is 
divided into ten contiguous blocks, each representing a task. Each turn, bits required per task are 
drawn at random from each block. An agent’s score each turn is the percentage of tasks they 
completed correctly.The first virtual experiment’s factors and constants are presented in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Virtual Experiment 1 - comparing behavior versus Full (Construct) and Multi-
Level (Construct-SC) implementations of transactive memory 
Factors Values # of Values 
Group Size and Number Single-Dominant (60%, Large), Single-Dominant 
(60%, Small), All-Equal (Large), All-Equal (Small) 
 
4 
Knowledge Distribution 
(Random, Group-
Based) 
Group-Based (0.01, .3), Random (.1, 0.0), Fuzzy 
Groups (0.03, .25) 
 
3 
Group Membership Single, Multiple 
 
2 
Interaction Drives 
(Homophily/Expertise) 
100/0, 60/40, 0/100 
 
3 
Transactive Memory Full, Multi-Level 2 
 Total Combinations 144 
 Runs Per Condition 10 
 Total Runs 1440 
   
Constants   
Agent Count 200  
Knowledge Count 400  
Sub-Tasks 10  
Time 800  
   
Outcomes   
In-Group Interaction 
Probability 
Average of each agent’s summed probabilities of 
interacting in-group 
 
Out-Group Interaction 
Probability  
Average of each agent’s summed probabilities of 
interacting out-group 
 
Knowledge Diffusion Summation of each agent’s knowledge-bit count  
Task Competencies Binary Task Classification (see above)  
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Table 3. Virtual Experiment 2 - comparing run-time results 
Factors Values # of Values 
Agent Count 1000, 5000, 10000, 15000 4 
Transactive Memory Full, Multi-Level 2 
 Total Combinations 8 
 Runs Per Condition 10 
 Total Runs 80 
   
Constants   
Group Size and Number All-Equal  
Knowledge Distribution 
(Random, Group-Based) 
Fuzzy Groups (0.03, .25)  
Group Membership Multiple  
Interaction Drives 
(Homophily/Expertise) 
60/40  
Knowledge Count 1000  
Sub-Tasks 10  
Time 365  
   
Outcomes   
Run Time Average turn length in seconds per agent  
 
Virtual Experiment Two: Empirical Observation of Achieved 
Efficiencies 
 
Virtual Experiment 2, described in Table 3, is used to evaluate Construct and Construct-SC’s run-
time costs. It is anticipated that the simulations using Construct-SC will have a much faster run-
time.  A formal analysis of Construct-SC’s memory complexity is provided next; however, 
evaluating Construct-SC’s time-complexity is highly dependent on a modeler’s choices.  Thus  
Virtual Experiment 2 was run to demonstrate achieved efficiencies for typical usage based on prior 
experience.  For these experiments, the group structures, knowledge distribution, interaction 
drives, knowledge count, sub-task count, time, and machine configuration are controlled. A 
powerful machine with 60 processors and 0.5 TB of memory to minimize noise in run-time results 
was used to run the virtual experiment. In each case, Construct was run on a single thread. 
 
The number of agents (agent count) in the simulation world, and the transactive memory model 
were varied.  The primary outcome variable was run-time, which was measured as average turn 
length per agent to make the results more easily comparable across the wide variation in number 
of agents. 
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Figure 1. Information Diffusion in Construct and Construct-SC. Both Models predict overall 
diffusion of information at similar rates across other variables.  
 
Results 
 
Following the pattern established by the virtual experiments, the results are presented in sub-
sections, related to the modeling of human behavior and to run-time results. 
 
An Improved Model of Human Behavior 
 
By improving the theory of mind implementation over that Construct, it is anticipated that the 
improved model, Construct-SC, will better represent the stylized facts described in Table 1.  The 
results demonstrate that adding social cognition is a theoretical win; i.e. the model with improved 
theory of mind produces results which better match Table 1’s stylized facts.  
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Figure 2. Construct-SC actors prefer to interact in-group unless only rare knowledge is 
valued and group membership is arbitrary 
 
 
In this section, Table 1 is used to guide the analysis of the results. First, both models should 
replicate information diffusion’s S-Shaped curve. The results in Figure 1, demonstrate that both 
models predict similar levels of information diffusion over time across all condition groups. 
Clearly, the curves represented do not show the traditional “bottom” of the expected S-shaped 
curve, but otherwise follow the expected pattern. The apparent difference from the traditional S-
shaped curve, however, can be readily attributed to the initial conditions of the model, which was 
set to ensure a reasonable run time. More specifically, because initial information density was set 
high, simulations essentially skip the ‘discovery’ phase for most knowledge bits. As is 
demonstrated, when considering multiple knowledge bits together to measure task performance, 
the familiar S-shaped curve returns (Figure 3). 
 
Construct-SC allows for group reasoning and group biases. People often privilege interaction with 
people within their social groups, even when those groups do not imply shared knowledge or 
understanding. Figure 2 is a series of line plots, showing the distribution of in-group bias with 
Construct and Construct-SC compared in every sub-graph. The separate columns represent how 
knowledge is distributed a priori; the separate rows represent the weighting of the expertise drive. 
Each sub-graph represents cumulative bias towards the in-group, with the X-axis being time. As 
shown in Figure 2, Construct-SC agents prefer to interact more with members of their own group 
than Construct agents in nearly all cases. The exceptions occur in the somewhat unlikely social 
situation where only the expertise drive is active, and thus only rare knowledge is valued. In the  
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Figure 3. Task performance of different groups are compared over time. Important social 
structures of the simulation drive variation in Construct-SC task adoption outcomes. 
 
fuzzy-group knowledge distribution, Construct-SC agents find value in interacting outside the 
group, at first, until enough members of their own group gain rare knowledge. In the random-case, 
Construct-SC agents tend to attribute knowledge they already possess to in-group members which 
does not offer any group cohesion. 
 
In task performance, it is anticipated that there will be variation over time in highly cliquish groups 
(West, et. al 1999), i.e., groups that prefer to interact with the in-group over interacting with people 
outside the group. Based on the findings from Figure 2, it is assumed that groups that are entirely 
homophily-driven (the top row) fit this definition. Construct-SC agents are, in general, more 
cliquish.  
 
Figure 3 is a series of line plots, showing the distribution of task performance with the Construct 
and Construct-SC compared in every sub-graph. Two separate graphs are presented, one where 
agents can be members of multiple groups, and one where they can only be a member of a single 
group. In both cases, every agent is a member of at least one group. Within each graph, the separate 
columns represent knowledge distribution, and the separate rows represent the weighting of the 
expertise drive. Each sub-graph represents the task performance of the population, with the Y-Axis 
being the summation of all agents’ capabilities to complete a large complicated task. The task was  
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Figure 4. Variation in task performance outcomes over time - Construct-SC shows a more 
pronounced U-Shape curve over time in all group-based knowledge distributions. 
 
defined as follows. First the knowledge was divided into ten parts using contiguous sets of 
knowledge bits. Then the bits required for each sub-task at each point in time were drawn from all 
bits related to that sub-task. Thus, performance on each task should be expected to vary over time, 
but as agents gain knowledge, they will become better able to contribute to the overall task, until 
nearly every agent can perform nearly all sub-tasks involved. The X-axis indicates time. Construct-
SC allows for much more variation in outcomes, and that variation is due to the simulation’s social 
structure. 
 
Figure 3 shows that simulation outcomes are sensitive to social structure.  The more agents are 
motivated by expertise, the faster performance tends to improve. Knowledge distributed a priori 
by group tends to diffuse slower, probably due to in-group biases shown in Figure 2. Construct-
SC agents, with their stronger in-group biases in general, tend to distribute task-knowledge more 
slowly. Multi-group memberships mitigate the effect.  
 
Figure 4 shows that outcome metric variations are different between Construct and Construct-SC. 
Construct-SC’s task performance outcome variations have a distinctive U-shape curve over time 
when knowledge is not randomly distributed – this pattern is muted in original Construct. Note 
that this is not merely the addition of more noise to the simulation model – instead the perceived 
additional variability is, in the outcome variable, structural in nature. When group membership is 
salient to performance (because knowledge is distributed through group memberships), there is 
low variability in performance both at the beginning and at the end of the simulation, i.e. at both  
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Table 4. Symbols used in analysis of the computational complexity 
Symbol Meaning 
| | Number of instances (e.g. |SO-TMV|) is the number of instances in the SO-
TMV 
G Number of groups 
N Number of agents 
K  Number of knowledge bits 
SOTM Agent perception of individuals (Significant Others Transactive Memory) 
GTM Agent perception of groups (Group Transactive Memory) 
NIntPerTurn Number of interactions an agent can have per turn 
Thresh Threshold of activation at which agent “forgets” an agent or group 
 
 
observed areas of the diffusion curve. . Rather than adding noise, social cognition reduces variation 
and so noise when group membership is salient. 
 
Better Behavior, Better Performance 
 
In general, as models become more veridical they become more computationally complex. In other 
words, the better the model of cognition, the longer it takes to simulate group behavior, and the 
more computer resources are required. In this section, Construct-SC’s computational performance 
is analyzed. The results demonstrate that adding a multi-level theory of mind is a computational 
win; i.e. to model the same number of agents in Construct-SC versus Construct requires less 
memory and runs faster.  
 
From a computational perspective, the new mechanism’s chief advantage is that it reduces the 
computer memory required to maintain transactive memory by implementing a variant of ACT-
R’s activation equations. In this section, a formal proof of this fact is provided, followed by an 
empirical demonstration that this space saving does not come at the cost of the simulation’s run-
time speed. These memory and run-times make it feasible to run much larger simulations in 
Construct-SC. Table 4 provides an overview of the symbols used in the derivations in this section.  
 
In Construct-SC the implementation of ACT-R’s activation equations are a variant of Petrov’s 
(2006) approximation. In this variant, agents “forget” information if its activation score is below 
a threshold. In Construct-SC, agents “forget” their perceptions, or transactive memory, of other 
agents and groups if they have not interacted with them recently. “Time” is represented by 
simulation turns, and thus bounds can be set on the amount of time before an agent “forgets” based 
on the number of simulation turns that have elapsed and a particular setting of the variables in the 
ACT-R equation. The following derivation utilizes this idea to bound the model’s memory 
requirements. 
 
In Table 4, the variables needed to calculate the algorithm’s complexity are defined. Then in Table 
5, the major mechanisms for Construct and Construct-SC are compared – defining their space 
complexity. As is clear, retaining perceptions of alters dominates the space complexity in 
Construct. Assuming that there will be many more agents than groups (N > G), the same is true of  
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Table 5. Computational complexity per agent of the social cognitive system 
Object Space Complexity- 
Construct 
Space Complexity- Construct-
SC 
Agent Knowledge O(NK) O(NK) 
Alter to Group Matrix N/A O(NG) 
Activation Mechanism N/A O(N*(|SOTM| + |GTM|)) 
Perceptions of others’ 
knowledge 
O(N2K) O(N*(|SOTM|+|GTM|)*K) 
Total O(N2K) O(max(NG, 
N*(|SOTM|+|GTM|)*K) 
 
Construct-SC. The primary question that must be answered is thus the size of |SOTM| + |GTM| 
relative to N, as this will identify the space savings obtained. 
 
To make this determination, assume that |GTM| == G, and again that G is small relative to N for 
this simulation model. In other words, assume that the number of groups that an agent can be in is 
insignificant as compared to the number of agents. The primary concern now becomes comparing 
|SOTM| and N. Assume that an agent has interacted with another agent T turns ago. Then, given 
the activation equations described by Petrov (2006) and the mechanism described, the following 
must be true for the agent to not “forget” the alter (where K is some initial, small, constant 
activation value to ensure Equation 1 is defined when T =0): 
 
 
(1) 
 
With some straightforward algebraic manipulation, results in an equation which defines the 
number of time steps, or simulation turns before which an agent will “forget” an alter that it 
interacted with once, T turns ago: 
 
 
(2) 
 
If an agent interacts with an alter only once, T turns ago, then the agent will forget the alter after a 
number of turns determined by the threshold parameter. In the pathological case where an alter 
interacts with NIntPerTurn unique alters each turn, then |SOTM| will be the minimum of N or the 
product NIntPerTurn * Equation 2. Modelers can tune parameters such that there are no space 
savings, where there are few agents and many allowed interactions. However, even at the most 
loose settings utilized in Virtual Experiment 2, where K=.1, NIntPerTurn=2, Thresh=-1, then 
|SOTM| is at most 15 agents large. This value is constant and does not depend on N, thus Construct-
SC, with realistic parameter settings, is an order of magnitude (in N) more space efficient than 
Construct. 
 
A formal analysis of Construct-SC’s time complexity is not provided because such an analysis 
would be dependent on the modeler’s choices, and thus could not be broadly generalized. Instead, 
an empirical assessment is provided as guidance, via Virtual Experiment 2, of a typical use of  
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Figure 5. Construct-SC takes less time to run for a similar number of agents. 
Construct, noting the same limitation. In Virtual Experiment 2, knowledge sizes were kept 
constant, but the number of agents was varied (from 1000 to 15,000). Figure 5 above shows a run-
time comparison of Construct and Construct-SC. Construct-SC runs faster across all population 
sizes. Note that Construct-SC’s time complexity does depend on the number of groups, but it is 
anticipated that the number used in Virtual Experiment 2 (10 groups) are typical of usage. 
 
Discussion 
 
In implementing Construct-SC, a multi-level model of group-based inferences, we see that 
stereotypes preserve resources and improve model behavior compared to models where agents 
retain transactive memory of all potential alters. Specifically, the model with group-based 
inferences: 
 18 
 
 
 
 
- Allows for arbitrary groupings of agents to significantly impact interaction between 
agents; 
- Shows significant in-group bias; 
- Supports wider variances in task performance, with that variance better supported by 
the structure of the knowledge space; 
- Runs faster and requires less memory.  
-  
Using the stylized facts from Table 1, the results of Virtual Experiment 1 are summarized in 
Table 6. 
 
Limiting the ability of agents to retain perceptions of alters and providing a group-based inference 
mechanism, resulted in agent behavior that is more true to established “stylized facts”. This 
suggests that people behave the way they do because they have finite cognitive resources which 
forces them to retain group-level schemas for actors they do not personally know. This research 
finding recalls the variety of work done with cognitive biases – and how these biases inform both 
extant social structures and how network researchers collect data on these structures. This work 
suggests an approach towards modeling the rich variety of socially relevant cognitive biases. 
 
Table 6. Summarization of Results Using the Stylized Facts 
Emergent Phenomenon Citation Construct Construct-SC 
Diffusion of new information follows an S-
Shaped Curve. 
Rogers 2010 Fig.1, Fig. 3 Fig.1, Fig. 3 
Heterogeneous groups are more likely to 
discover novel information from outside the 
group than are homophilous groups. 
Granovetter 1983; 2005 Fig.2 Fig.2 
Groups with some heterogeneity 
outperform purely homophilous groups. 
 
Ancona & Caldwell 1992 Expertise: Fig.3 
Expertise: Fig.3 
K-Distro: Fig.3 
Individuals are more likely to interact in-
group than out-group. 
Blau 1977; Tajfel & 
Turner 1979 
Homophily: 
Fig.2 
All except 
Random+/Expertise: 
Fig. 2 
The improvement in task competency of 
cliquish groups will have significantly more 
marginal variation over time. 
 
West, Barron, Dowsett, & 
Newton 1999 
 Fig. 4 
Our perceptions of other people are often 
based upon things such as expected roles, 
social norms, and social categorizations. 
 
Greenwald & Banaji 
1995; Heise 1979; 2007 
 Fig.2 
Arbitrary and even meaningless 
distinctions between groups can trigger a 
tendency to favor one's own group at the 
expense of others. 
 
Tajfel et al. 1971  Fig.2 
Transactive memory should preserve 
computational resources. 
Wegner 1995  
Table 4 
Fig.5 
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Although a significant advancement in agent modeling, this work still has several limitations. First, 
and most significantly, the model of groups could be improved in a variety of ways. In Construct-
SC groups are universal and group membership is immediately visible to others. This 
implementation of groups is best fit for superficial grouping characteristics, such as coarse-grained 
representations of age, gender and race. A more advanced group model would include spontaneous 
group formation, a process by which agents infer group membership, and the ability for agents to 
leave groups. Despite these limitations, the relevance of groups in the current model is not uniform 
to every agent; it is based on who these actors tend to interact with. Thus, the abstractions of groups 
themselves may be lost over time. 
 
This model could be further explored by being placed in a specific interesting context, such as a 
small town or village with well-defined demographics; where group sizes are not roughly 
equivalent, and membership in multiple groups is constant. Comparing the spread of knowledge 
and beliefs in Construct and Construct-SC in such a context, with perhaps a comparison to a 
historical situation of interest, would be worthwhile. 
 
The group inference mechanisms assume that these group inferences are generally, if not perfectly, 
accurate. This model ignores the ability of agents to select media and other sources of information 
that bias their inferences. However, this model does allow for agents to have more or less personal 
bias in their understanding of alters, but this does not entirely overcome the issue of bias in media 
sources. 
 
The ability to use group membership to inform an implemented theory of mind is a useful extension 
to the agent literature that other models could learn from. The results demonstrate that group 
stereotypes allow agents to conserve resources, make decisions faster, and better emulate human 
behavior. 
 
Overall, this paper demonstrates the value of implementing social cognition in models of human 
social behavior. By adding a multi-level model of theory of mind to a network interaction model, 
the emergent behavior better reflects real human social behavior and reduces computational 
complexity. The complexity reduction reduces costs in time and in computational hardware, 
making it feasible to model substantially larger populations. For a modeler, this is a clear win. 
Theoretically, it suggests that social cognition provides humans with a fast heuristic approach for 
processing vast quantities of data with less effort. It further suggests that peculiarities of social 
behavior may be the consequence of cognitive limitations that admit inferences about individuals 
and groups given social generalizations. 
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